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Connecting East and West through Modern 




This study is an attempt to establish that 20th century’s canonized Taiwanese philosopher 
Mou Zongsan (1909–1995) has contributed significantly to the innovative burgeoning of 
modern Confucianism (or New Confucianism) with the revision of Western philosophy. 
This is based on the hypothesis that if ideas travel through the past to the present, and vice 
versa, and if intellectual thinking never knows any national, cultural and social bounda-
ries, then there is an obvious intersection and communication of philosophical thoughts 
of East and West. This article also contemplates the fact that Western philosophies are 
widely known as they are widely published, read and circulated. Conversely, due to the 
language barriers philosophy and philosophers from the East are less widely known. 
Therefore, this research critically introduces and connects the early 20th century Con-
fucian philosopher Shili Xiong (1885–1968), his disciple the contemporary Taiwanese 
Confucian intellectual Mou Zongsan, along with the Western philosophers Immanuel 
Kant (1724–1804), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and Herman Bavinck (1854–1921), 
through ideas like moral autonomy, ethics, ontology, and imago Dei. In so doing, the ar-
ticle delineates the path to study 20th century Taiwanese philosophy, or broadly Chinese 
Confucian philosophy which makes a bridge between the East and the West through 
Modern Confucianism prevalently called New Confucianism.
Keywords: Mou Zongsan, Modern Confucianism, New Confucianism, Immanuel Kant, 
Martin Heidegger, Herman Bavinck
Povezovanje Vzhoda in Zahoda skozi moderno konfucijansko misel:  
ponovno branje tajvanske filozofije 20. stoletja
Izvleček
Študija poskuša pokazati, da je kanonizirani tajvanski filozof 20. stoletja Mou Zongsan 
(1909–1995) z revizijo zahodne filozofske tradicije pomembno prispeval k inovativnemu 
razcvetu modernega konfucijanstva (ali novega konfucijanstva). Izhajamo iz hipoteze, da 
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če ideje potujejo skozi preteklost do sedanjosti in vice versa in če intelektualno mišljenje 
ne pozna nacionalnih, kulturnih in družbenih meja, obstajata jasno stičišče in povezava 
med filozofsko mislijo Vzhoda in Zahoda. V članku razmišljamo tudi o dejstvu, da so 
zahodne filozofske smeri splošno poznane, saj so močno razširjene in brane. Po drugi 
strani pa zaradi jezikovnih pregrad filozofija in filozofi Vzhoda niso enako vsesplošno 
prepoznavni. Ta raziskava zato na kritičen način predstavi konfucijanskega filozofa zgo-
dnjega 20. stoletja Shili Xionga (1885–1968) in njegovega učenca, sodobnega tajvanske-
ga konfucijanskega intelektualca Mou Zongsana, ter ju poveže z zahodnimi filozofi, kot 
so Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) in Herman Bavinck 
(1854–1921), in sicer skozi ideje, kot so moralna avtonomija, etika, ontologija in imago 
Dei. Članek tako začrta pot k proučevanju tajvanske filozofije 20. stoletja oziroma, širše, 
kitajske konfucijanske filozofije, ki skozi moderno konfucijanstvo, v splošnem poznano 
kot novo konfucijanstvo, pomeni most med Vzhodom in Zahodom.
Ključne besede: Mou Zongsan, moderno konfucijanstvo, novo konfucijanstvo, Immanuel 
Kant, Martin Heidegger, Herman Bavinck
Introduction: Mou Zongsan as the Greatest Philosopher among 
Contemporary Modern Confucians
If twentieth century China produced a philosopher of the f irst rank, 
it was Mou Zongsan. 
(Clower 2014, 1) 
The epigraph is taken from Jason Clower’s edited and translated book, Late 
Works of Mou Zongsan1—Selected Essays on Chinese Philosophy (2014), where 
Clower discusses how Mou Zongsan’s source of sagacity and the philosophi-
cal root of his thought is entrenched in Confucianism. For example, Mou im-
plies Confucian morality with moral metaphysics. Clower also states that Mou 
(1909–1995) not only held a deep understanding of the philosophical legacy 
of the East, especially of China, but also had a strong affinity with Western 
intellectual traditions, including German, Anglo-American, and Greco-Roman 
philosophy. Although intellectuals like Jiang Qing, Li Zehou, Chan Lai and Lin 
Anwu criticized Mou on several points—one of which is that he revised Confu-
cianism through the lens of Western thought instead of connecting it with the 
1 Born and educated in Shandong Province of China, and later moving to Taiwan and living there 
till his last breath, Mou Zongsan 牟宗 is considered a New Confucian philosopher of paramount 
importance in the modern era. Mou read and wrote on Western philosophers like Immanuel Kant 
and attempted to revise the latter’s system of thought based on Confucian philosophy. See Chan 
2006, 125, 126, 139. 
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local context, particularly with regard to mainland China—what is important 
that these philosophers do not hold any doubt that Mou relentlessly worked 
for the revitalization and restoration of Chinese intellectual thought in Taiwan 
and abroad (Chan 2012, 16–17; Makeham 2008, 175–76). In reality, Mou, the 
prolific writer and scholar of Confucian philosophy, helped Chinese intellectual 
traditions escape from considerable confinement and produced several volumes 
on the intellectual history of the region. Therefore, Mou’s lifespan in the 20th 
century can be designated as covering an era of the revitalization and restoration 
of Chinese intellectual thought.
While during the course of 20th century the leaders and intellectuals of China 
were principally considering many varied issues, forms and reforms in the field of 
Sinification, Taiwanese intellectuals like Mou Zongsan found their way to discov-
er the need to adapt other forms of modern Western thought, particularly orig-
inating from German, Anglo-American and Greco-Roman classical philosophy 
(Billioud 2011; Rošker 2019). The aim was to modernize Chinese traditions and 
consider Confucianism’s appropriateness for a modern society; for example, Con-
fucianism as a cultural force advises ways of living that can advance capitalism and 
industrialization; and the method used was to apply concepts from the European 
enlightenment and modernity. Intellectuals like Mou thought that the revitali-
zation and restoration of Confucianism was necessary because, in the mid-20th 
century, Chinese religious and philosophical traditions (including Confucianism) 
faced disorder and restrictions in China. For example, during the 20th century 
Confucianism was rarely offered as a feasible way of thinking, but rather it was 
condemned as to blame for China’s stagnation for the last few of centuries and 
therefore largely rejected (Sigurðsson 2014, 22), with mostly Taiwanese philoso-
phers pushing for its revitalization and restoration (Rošker 2019). Additionally, 
in the 1980s this restoration process presented assorted multifaceted, comprehen-
sible and emerging philosophical systems that showed the exceptional inventive-
ness of many Taiwanese theorists, such as Mou Zongsan. 
In post-war Taiwan, various ways of investigating and attempts to develop tradi-
tional Chinese thoughts have been identified with the emerging Confucian in-
tellectuals. There is plenty of research on separate aspects of Chinese religious 
and philosophical traditions, but few studies examine the inherent intersections, 
origins, and developments that took place at a later stage, especially in the 20th 
century. This essay studies the thriving development, revitalization and resto-
ration of Chinese intellectual thought in contemporary Taiwanese society, and 
explores the inherent connection between intellectual thoughts of the East and 
West through Confucian intellectual traditions. In particular, this research criti-
cally introduces and involves the early 20th century Confucian philosopher Shili 
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Xiong (1885–1968)2 and his disciple the contemporary Taiwanese Confucian in-
tellectual Mou Zongsan, along with the Western philosophers Immanuel Kant, 
Martin Heidegger, and Herman Bavinck, using ideas like moral autonomy, eth-
ics, ontology, and imago Dei. In so doing, this research familiarizes readers with 
schools of thought and intellectuals from East with West who have contributed 
significantly to the innovative burgeoning of contemporary Chinese philosophy, 
and thus makes a bridge that connects dissimilar discourses across time and space 
by informing and revealing several otherwise neglected traditions of Confucian 
philosophy.
The Revival of Modern Confucianism
In the early 20th century, an invigorated intellectual movement of Confucianism 
started which has spread its influence beyond the post-Mao era in contemporary 
China. This modern movement, which is also deeply influenced by but not iden-
tical to the Neo-Confucianism of the Song Dynasty, has been designated as New 
Confucianism. Scholars like John Makeham consider New Confucianism as the 
neo-conservative movement of several Chinese orthodox ru (Confucian) tradi-
tions, with religious implications, and that this new movement promotes certain 
Confucian social elements (for instance, political, ecological and social harmo-
ny) as appropriate for the contemporary context in combination with Western 
ideas like humanism and rationalism (Makeham 2003, 25, 81). The philosophy 
of New Confucianism is comprised of discussions among Confucian scholars 
from Taiwan, Hong Kong, the USA, and mainland China, with both first- and 
second-generation scholars. Before we enter the discussion of how the synthesis 
(Mou’s philosophy in synthesis with that of Western philosophers) can be mate-
rialized, this paper attempts to elaborate briefly on the issue of certain Confucian 
social elements, such as political, ecological and social harmony, and how they 
can be placed in a contemporary context in combination with Western notions of 
humanism and rationalism. Several papers regarding this topic have already been 
published in the journal Asian Studies (2014, vol. 2, no.1),3 from which further 
understanding can be obtained. 
2 Xiong Shili (1885–1968) is a well-known intellectual and writer of Confucian traditions who was 
born in Hubei Province in China. He contributed extensively to the revitalization and restoration 
of Confucianism in 20th century China, and thus is a key person in contemporary Chinese intel-
lectual history, making a path for the rejuvenation of the Confucian “Way”—dao (Yu 2002). 
3 See “Modern Confucianism and Chinese Modernity” in Asian Studies (2014, vol. 2, no.1).
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Promotion of Certain Confucian Social Elements
In the issue of Asian Studies titled Modern Confucianism and Chinese Modernity, 
Lee Ming-huei in his Chinese foreword discusses several issues related to the 
developments of Confucian socio-political elements in the twentieth century. The 
1950s saw a debate between the modern Confucians and liberal intellectuals, par-
ticularly from Hong Kong and Taiwan. According to Lee, the debate examined 
whether an ancient Chinese culture like Confucianism was still relevant for the 
development of modern science, technology and political organization (Lee 2014, 
16). The “development of democracy from Confucianism” is a notion that Con-
fucians from Taiwan and Hong Kong presented, and this idea not only advocates 
the acknowledgment of limitations with regard to the relationship between mo-
rality and politics but also reflects the understanding that China needs to update 
its tradition of Confucianism in order to be “a modern, technologically developed 
and democratic state” (ibid., 17). The point of departure for Lee is to show how 
Confucianism does not exclude the other, as he shows how Taiwanese intellec-
tuals have not disregarded pluralistic approaches to democracy that depend on 
dissimilar cultural traditions. Keeping this view in mind, and although indirectly, 
these Confucian scholars contributed to the democratization of Taiwan. 
Although the discussions and attempts to re-evaluate Confucianism’s suitability 
for a modernized Asian society took place in China and Taiwan, similar democra-
tization processes also took place in other East Asian countries, such as Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Korea, and Vietnam (see Ali 2020). The Confucian scholar Geir 
Sigurðsson (2014), in his article “Confucianism vs. Modernity: Expired, Incom-
patible or Remedial?”, notes that Confucianism remains appealing as an ideology, 
on the basis that Confucianism was the “cultural ground of Singapore’s economic 
success story” (Sigurðsson 2014, 24). He suggests,
It was in Singapore that Confucianism was first suggested as a potential 
catalyst for modernization after Lee Kuan Yew’s government introduced 
Confucian ethics in the secondary curriculum in 1982. What ensued was 
a major philosophical, sociological and economic discussion hosted by 
the Institute of East Asian Philosophies (IEAP), which was established 
at the National University of Singapore in 1983, about Asian and nota-
bly Confucian values as an appropriate platform for social and economic 
modernization. (ibid., 23)
In a critical manner, Sigurðsson briefly informs us about an account of Confu-
cianism’s suitability for a modernized society, and particularly since the 1980s in 
relation to China. In Singapore there has been a debate as to whether Confucian 
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values should be re-established due to the fears raised by other ethnic groups in 
the country with regard to the state being Sinicized. But despite this, the impor-
tance and relevance of Confucianism have remained intact in Singapore. Initially, 
Sigurðsson states how Confucianism has been considered as a stimulant for eco-
nomic activity in Singapore, due to the Confucian sense of (political and social) 
collectivism:
By concocting a Confucian cultural foundation, the People’s Action Par-
ty under Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership has found a vindication for continu-
ing its authoritarian rulership in a period of world history characterized 
by growing demands for stronger democratic principles. The state was 
attempting to “naturalise, validate, and ironically reunite (Chinese) Sin-
gaporeans with a presumed moral and philosophical code”. Ong Pang 
Boon 王邦文, a first-generation People’s Action Party politician, and an 
outspoken critic of the Confucian programme, warned that successive 
generations of monarchs had always made use of and promoted those 
parts of Confucianism that were advantageous to feudal rule. In this re-
spect, it is illuminating that in the 1970s and into the mid-1980s, the 
Singapore leadership praised and encouraged “rugged individualism” un-
til it suddenly began endorsing a Confucian kind of collectivism, duty, 
and self-sacrifice. (Sigurðsson 2014, 24)
He then moves on to discuss contemporary attempts to accommodate Confu-
cianism in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in order to establish the fact 
that “Confucianism can be a healthy antidote to some of the ills produced by 
contemporary capitalist practice” (ibid., 26). While the importance of Confu-
cianism’s relevance to China’s future has never been undermined, and Confucian 
values have always been considered as something essential, they re-entered the 
discussion more strongly in 1989 when the student protests were crushed. In the 
21st century, from the grassroots to the state level, Confucianism has become a 
new and incessant “craze” for “national learning” (guoxue 国学). Public and private 
educational institutions in China have emphasized the continuance of Confucian 
philosophy, including more than three hundred Confucian Institutes operating 
globally where Confucianism is presented as an ideology for “China’s future”, or 
“a practical guide for everyday life”. Though there are different schools of thought 
(such as Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang) regarding the appropriate way of 
adopting Confucianism in order to meet modern challenges, Confucian-inspired 
policies are widely endorsed to create a new “harmonious society”.
The basis of this harmonious society depends on factors like the sense of be-
longing and sharedness in a community. In his article, “Faith and Politics: 
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(New) Confucianism as Civil Religion”, the scholar Bart Dessein (2014) ex-
plores the relevance of Confucian values in contemporary China by re-dis-
cussing Confucianism as reflected in China’s political and religious narratives, 
which seek to generate the sense of belonging and sharedness in a community 
with a divine mission. This mission is amalgamated with issues like patriotism 
and nationalism. Dessein interprets these as constitutive elements of a “civil 
religion with Chinese Characteristics”, which provides the foundation of the 
Confucian state: 
That the Confucian state is characterized by an intimate and recipro-
cal relationship between the ruling house, state power, the concept of 
“empire”, and the realm of the divine is well illustrated in the follow-
ing declaration Emperor Yuan of the Han (r. 48–22 BCE) made at the 
beginning of his reign: “We make it a point to establish personally our 
ancestral temple because this is the ultimate power to build up our au-
thority, eliminate the sprouts of rebellion, and make the people one”. This 
brings us to the broader political mission of the Chinese Confucian state. 
Commenting on the Daxue, (The Great Learning), the 39th chapter of 
the Liji (Records of Ritual), a work compiled in the Han Dynasty in the 
3rd to 2nd centuries BCE, Wing-tsit Chan (1963, 84) says the follow-
ing: “The importance of this little classic is far greater than its small size 
would suggest. It gives the Confucian educational, moral, and political 
programs in a nutshell, neatly summed up in the so-called ‘three items’: 
manifesting the clear character of man, loving the people and abiding in 
the highest good; and in the ‘eight steps’: the investigation of things, ex-
tension of knowledge, sincerity of the will, the rectification of the mind, 
cultivation of the personal life, regulation of the family, national order, 
and world peace.” (Sigurðsson 2014, 47)
The contemporary political and religious mission with its emphasis on patriotism 
and nationalism reflects this history that signifies national order and world peace. 
Even in the present religious, historical and political narratives, New Confucian-
ism has been described as a constitutive component of a “civil religion with Chi-
nese Characteristics”. In the West, for example in American society, civil religion 
can be employed as a tool to operate and transform perceptions about how the 
USA works as a Christian nation, and which can come close to seeing the USA as 
embodying God’s will. In the East, Confucianism plays a similar role for Chinese 
society. Though started in the 20th century, this development gets new shape in 
the 21st century. For example, on 21 April 2006, the then member of the Politburo 
of the Chinese Communist Party and president of the organizational committee 
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of the Beijing Olympic Games, Liu Qi, declared the Olympic slogan: “One peo-
ple, One Dream”. He elaborated that the ideology that China holds is to share the 
global community and civilization in order to build a bright future, keeping hand-
in-hand with people all over the world (ibid., 57). Qi stated this ideology reflects 
the trust of a great nation with a history of 5,000 years long and its contempo-
rary modernization that is committed to peaceful progress, a harmonious society 
and the happiness of its people. According to Dessein, Qi’s comments hold three 
significant claims: a) China as a nation has a history of 5,000 years; b) Chinese 
desire to be a part of a peaceful globalized world; and c) modernization of earlier 
Chinese traditions will lead to harmonious society at both the national and inter-
national levels (ibid., 57). In 2013, the Chinese government presented this idea 
as the “Chinese Dream”. These three claims promote two types of nationalism: 
cultural and political, where cultural nationalism is rooted in the long Chinese 
history, while political nationalism originated with the concept of modernization 
that started in the 20th century.
20th Century, Xiong Shili and the New Development of Confucianism
In the early 20th century, especially after the May Fourth Movement of 1919, 
Confucianism was blamed for China’s weakness and decay in the face of Western 
“aggression”, but a few intellectuals successfully contributed to the revitalization 
and restoration of Confucianism in the form of New Confucianism (Cheng 
and Bunnin 2002; Rošker 2009). Although mainstream Chinese philosophers 
considered that the redemption of China as an integrated society needed the 
adoption of Western science and democracy, others took the opposite position 
saying that the crisis in China happened because of the loss of authentic Con-
fucian dao (Rošker 2009; Yu 2002). Therefore, the only way forward is not in 
abandoning Confucianism, but rather in the revival and restoration of the real 
Confucian spirit (Yu 2002, 127). Some of these thinkers used Asian philosophy 
to interpret Confucianism in the modern era, while others synthesized it with 
Western philosophies. The philosopher Shili Xiong (1885–1968) is one of the 
new representative voices, whose New Doctrine4 is drawn from the Asian in-
tellectual traditions that he considers need to be integrated into contemporary 
Chinese philosophy in order to better think in terms of “inborn human quali-
ties”. He critically engages with this new approach and discusses how the revival 
of Confucianism is essential for China:
4 Yu writes, “it is now almost universally held that in the New Doctrine, Xiong built the most creative 
philosophical system in contemporary Chinese Philosophy” (Yu 2002, 128).
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I try to illuminate the fundamentals of benevolence and righteousness. 
This was accused by many of being impractical and empty. However, if 
there is no way to stop the prevailing of the heresy and stop its flowing, 
our country, and our nationality will be extinct. How could there be an-
other way to save [China]. (Xiong in Yu 2002, 127–28)
Because of his distinct way of expressing Chinese philosophical thought in a way 
that had become even more relevant in contemporary times, Xiong is considered 
as the most innovative and creative Chinese philosopher of the modern period. 
According to Ng You-Kwan, 
whether judged in terms of depth and comprehensiveness in content or 
in terms of theoretical vigour, Xiong’s philosophical achievements are 
great and can be compared with those of Western philosophers such as 
Aristotle, Leibniz, Husserl, Heidegger, and Whitehead. In Chinese phi-
losophy, his scope is on par with that of Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Wang 
Fuzhi (Ng 2003, 239). 
Xiong was an expert in Buddhist classics, and thus his philosophy also draws on 
Buddhist philosophy, particularly Yogacara Buddhism. In the first two decades of 
the 20th century, much importance was placed on logic and this had a great in-
fluence on the progress of academic Chinese philosophy. Similarly, the restoration 
of Yogacara thought by the foremost Chinese intellects from the late 1890s to the 
1930s played a vital role in determining the currents in Chinese philosophy and 
modern Chinese thought. In a “Translator’s Introduction”, the Confucian scholar 
John Makeham writes: 
Yogacara (Yuqie Xingpai, yogic practice) is one of the two most influen-
tial philosophical systems of Indian Buddhism, along with Madhyamaka. 
Historically, both weishi (nothing but consciousness) and faxiang (dhar-
ma-laksana, dharma characteristics) were used to refer to the Yogacara 
school in China. After the Tang Dynasty, faxiang was used to denote 
the famous pilgrim and monk Xuanzang’s (602–644) Yogacara school, 
but soon became a mildly derogatory expression used by its opponents, 
mocking the Yogocaras for pursuing the “characteristics of dharmas” 
rather than the real nature of dharmas (faxing). Despite this, the Yoga-
caras later adopted the term, and in Japan it continues to be the official 
name of this school (in Japanese Hosso). (Makeham 2015, xii)
The background discussion on Yogacara Buddhism not only informs us about 
the basis of Xiong’s philosophy, but also helps us to trace how Xiong’s disciples 
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were influenced by this. For example, Mou Zongsan’s intellectual traditions were 
also influenced by Yogacara Buddhism, where, like Yogacara, Mou also believes 
that objectivity is not possible without subjectivity. Moreover, Xiong claims that 
the classics of Eastern thought should be unified with modern Chinese thinking 
for more practical strength, while he also identifies the same need in Buddhism 
regarding “inborn human qualities”. Xiong finds the brighter sides to “inborn 
human qualities”, and he discards the Buddhist teachings of “daily decrease”—a 
philosophy that indicates the negative aspects of human nature and then guides 
us to decrease them—and states that the exercise of restraining one’s dark na-
ture is compulsory, which he connects and learns from classical Confucianism. 
His understanding of Confucianism claims that it not only scrutinizes the dark 
aspects of “inborn human qualities”, but also considers how it is necessary to get 
used to rituals, the purpose of maintaining rituals and the achievement of ren, 
and this approach does not focus on restricting the negative sides of “inborn 
human qualities”, but instead on adopting the “the fundamental goodness” that 
Mencius calls the duan of humans (Xiong 2015, 129). Moreover, Xiong argues 
that the root of the “daily decrease’ is in Buddhism’s metaphysical belief of an 
“unbridgeable” division between an utterly fixed reality, and a continuously var-
ying and conditional phenomenal world, what Jiyuan Yu calls “separation theo-
ry”—a theory that separates the objective world from the mind, or reality from 
substance (Yu 2002). This utterly fixed reality (Dharma-nature or fa-xiang) and 
conditional phenomenal world (Dharma-Characters, or fa-xiang) become the 
centre of attraction for Confucian scholars. Because Xiong’s theory of correcting 
the “daily decrease” relies heavily on what Jiyuan designates the “sameness the-
sis”—a thesis that claims the two worlds are unified or come as the same entity. 
Xiong claims, fundamentally, the exact reality and function are not two different 
things with two different natures, but one—the world of reality and function is 
a unity: 
If they are separable, the function will differ from original reality and 
exist independently, and in that way, the function will have its original 
reality. We should not seek for some entity outside function and name 
it original reality. Furthermore, if original reality exists independently of 
function, it is a useless reality. In that case, if it is not a dead thing, it must 
be a dispensable thing. Thinking back and forth, I believe that original re-
ality and function are not separable. This should be beyond doubt. (Xiong 
in Yu 2002, 133)
Xiong further states that function is not something we perceive other than orig-
inal reality. In that case, we will need to search for another basis of function. 
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He considers that any function must presume a basis and hereafter needs to be 
distinguished from original reality, which will result in a “regress ad infinitum”. 
Moreover, his idea of this unity reflects his earlier works like New Treatise on the 
Uniqueness of Consciousness, where he claims that reality is congruent to mind: 
My aim in writing this treatise is to awaken those who study the learning 
that is concerned with fundamental wisdom to understand that reality 
(tuttva) is not a perceptual field detached from one’s mind, nor it is a 
cognitive object of knowledge. This is because it is only by seeking with-
in that there is correspondence with true realization. True realization is 
the self ’s recognizing the self, with absolutely nothing concealed. Corre-
spondence with true realization is called wisdom because it differs from 
the mundane world, which is established on the basis of discernment 
(prajna). (Xiong 2015, 21) 
Therefore, for Xiong, reality is equal to mind which does not reveal itself to one’s 
mind, but is about universal presence. In this sense, there is a universality of mind 
amongst all beings, and accordingly this form of being is the reality. In this way, 
he indicates and emphasizes the self-mastery of one’s desires. He claims that by 
failing to control one’s desire of the mind, one remains a “heap of dead matter”. 
His argument is that one should perceive the substances of the world internally, 
because what is external is eventually also internal, and they are one as both mind 
and reality. Later we see this in Mou’s intellectualism, that was also influenced 
by Yogacara Buddhism, which believes that no objectivity is possible aside from 
subjectivity.
Connecting East to West: Mou’s Confucian Philosophy with 
Western Philosophy
The founding father of the modern New Confucian school of philosophy, Shili 
Xiong, helped produce a few towering figures who later carried the legacy of mod-
ern Confucian thought and contributed to its flourishing. Xiong’s best-known 
students are Tang Junyi (1909–1978), Xu Fuguan (1903–1982) and Mou Zong-
san (1909–1995), who were not only great disciples but also promoted Xiong’s 
philosophical ideas, helping “cultural China” to become the dominant philosophi-
cal current of Chinese philosophy in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In the 
last few decades, there have been attempts to criticize Xiong’s philosophy using 
a narrow point of view, but in making Xiong a crucial link in the “transmission 
of the succession of the way” from the Ming Dynasty to the 20th century and 
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the retrospective creation of the New Confucian School, his disciples (like Mou 
Zongsan) “inherited, carried on, and advanced the teaching of the Humaneness 
of Confucian sages, and also inherited, carried on and advanced the aspirations 
of the Great Confucians of late Ming” (Makeham 2015, xiv). Therefore, Mou 
Zongsan is respected as one of the most influential second-generation philoso-
phers whose philosophy of metaphysics eventually connects with Xiong’s. What 
is important about Mou is that he has built upon Xiong’s theories on “mind and 
reality” with regard to their more practical, socio-political aspects: claiming that 
universality should exist in all philosophical truth, and proposing that political 
and social notions of the world can be linked in the essence of goodness. For Mou, 
particularity exists because of the dissimilar systems that are grounded in different 
cultures. Yet, after a range of philosophical reasonings and interpretations, these 
dissimilar systems arrive at a similar philosophical truth. He understands that 
our physical limitations and restrictions—for example, our physical being—make 
these dissimilar systems and dissimilar cultures. Moreover, aspects of being that 
appear in the mind—for instance, forms—are still revealed and exist within this 
physical world. Mou advocates that we should not let these restrictions deter us 
from being involved with the philosophical reasoning of society, culture, science, 
and politics (ibid. 2015).
A historical necessity—the philosophical type of necessity that derives from the 
essence of the things which follow from the internal connection of social phe-
nomenon—that follows human beings’ particularity is at the centre of Mou’s po-
litical philosophy. He suggests that dissimilar systems of dissimilar nations and 
their existence can be interpreted chiefly because of this historical necessity. Mou 
states that historical necessity occurs not only due to logical need or metaphysical 
requirement, but also due to the development of a spirit that he designates as 
“dialectical necessity”—which promotes establishing the spirit of truth through 
reasoned arguments. He argues that we should perceive and explain history as 
an entity that has historical necessity (here he means dialectical necessity) and 
ethical necessity—a necessity that is guided by moral obligations—which leads 
him to conclude that there should only be two types of judgment, moral, and 
historical. He asserts whether it is Chinese or Greek, the basic requirements in 
terms of the background of history and fundamental human characteristics are 
identical, and thus universality in philosophical truth occurs even behind history 
and politics. Mou’s understanding of historical and moral judgment is directly 
related to New Confucianism, where he strives to contribute to the re-evalua-
tion of Sinology and modernization of Chinese culture and generates his ideas 
around the New Confucian manifesto, harmonious society and inclusive wisdom 
(Rošker 2016b). The new Confucian Manifesto as a phrase was first used in 1963, 
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following the essay “A Manifesto on Chinese Culture to the World”, (1958) by 
Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Zhang Junmai. Eventually, this work 
became more important and has since been designated as the New Confucian 
Manifesto, even though the writers did not use this term in the article (Yu 2008). 
This manifesto offers a vision of Chinese culture which holds fundamental unity 
through all history, with Confucianism the highest expression of it. The account 
of Confucianism provided by the Manifesto is heavily influenced by Neo-Con-
fucianism, especially a version of Neo-Confucianism is linked with a philosopher 
from the Ming Dynasty, Wang Yangming (1472–1529), in contrast to a version 
set out by a philosopher of Song Dynasty, Zhu Xi (1130–1200). The Confucian 
scholar Fang Keli claims that this manifesto has had a huge influence and should 
be considered “the most important event in the course of the second development 
phase of modern Neo-Confucianism” (Fang 1995, 24). The main argument of the 
manifesto is that China must learn modern science and democracy from the West, 
while the West should learn from the Chinese intellectual tradition, particularly 
from Confucianism, which is often considered as a pearl offering all-encompass-
ing wisdom (Bresciani 2001), and which also works as the basis of a harmonious 
society (Rošker 2016a). 
The notion of a harmonious society and Confucianism are interconnected, 
where the idea itself refers to the time of Confucius and the philosophy around 
it, which also featured in the development of New Confucianism (Fan 2010; 
Rošker 2016a). In the contemporary discussion, it comes back as a vital charac-
teristic of ex-Communist Party general secretary Hu Jintao’s signature ideology 
of the Scientific Development Concept that flourished between 2000 and 2010, 
which was revised by the Hu-Wen administration during the 2005 National 
People’s Congress (Bell 2006; Perris 1983). The reason for this philosophy of 
social harmony becoming more important is the growing social inequality and 
injustice in mainland China due to its regulated economic growth, which has 
resulted in social conflict. Therefore, the philosophy of the governing body has 
changed in the face of economic developments to embrace an inclusive societal 
balance and harmony (Fan 2006). The making of a harmonious society has been 
set as one of the national goals for the ruling Communist Party, along with its 
aim of creating a moderately prosperous society. Embracing and promoting the 
way of a harmonious society shows that Hu Jintao surpassed the ruling phi-
losophy of the previous leaders. During his time and near the end of his years 
in power, Hu attempted to spread this philosophy to give it an international 
dimension in order to promote international peace and cooperation, with a view 
to creating a harmonious world, although Hu’s successor Xi Jinping has em-
ployed it in a more careful manner (Zhong 2006). As in the governing bodies, 
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there are different views among the Confucian scholars on this issue. For exam-
ple, Daniel A. Bell and Yan Xuetong call for the reestablishment of meritocratic 
Confucian institutions like the Censorate—a high-level supervisory body of 
ancient China, which was established during Qing Dynasty—and other bodies 
as a part of the New Confucian political agenda (Bell 2016; Yan 2018). On the 
other hand, scholars like Jana S. Rošker state that Confucianism is not some-
thing we can call a monolithic system of thought, nor a static traditional phi-
losophy, but instead Confucianism is more a dissimilar stream of thoughts that 
can be employed moderately, subjectively and selectively by modern thinkers, as 
epitomized by their use in legitimizing the state power (Rošker 2016a; 2019). 
Taking the historical expansion of the notion of harmony, it is possible to see to 
what degree the philosophical traditions are grounded on historical conventions 
and to what degree they are an artefact of the modern Western philosophical 
and political strains of the current period. For example, Mou has taken steps 
to integrate the Confucian philosophical traditions and notions with Western 
thoughts on metaphysics, and attempted to delineate the innovative develop-
ment of New Confucianism in 20th century China and the international arena 
of philosophical judgments concerning the Western philosophical ideas. Draw-
ing from Jana S Rošker’s Rebirth of the Moral Self (2016b), Dessein discusses 
how Mou differentiated a traditional Chinese “functional expression of reason” 
from a “Western constructive expression of reason”:
Having studied Western philosophy from a comparative perspective with 
the indigenous Confucian tradition, he differentiated what he called a 
traditional Chinese “functional expression of reason” (lixingzhi yunyong 
biaoxian) from a Western “constructive expression of reason” (lixingzhi 
jiagou biaoxian). For him, the “functional expression of reason” is to be 
equated with one’s morality, that is, to speak with Zhu Xi, the result of 
the way qi operates in function of the principle li. This “functional ex-
pression of reason” is practical in the sense that it is connected with actual 
life. Influenced by Wang Yangming’s xinxue thinking that “the origin of 
the intention is the possibility for knowledge”, he advocated that China’s 
traditional lack of a “constructive expression of reason”—his interpre-
tation of Kant’s “theoretical reason”—had to be solved through finding 
“intellectual intuition” also in Chinese “functional reason”. The moral self 
in its “functional expression of reason” and the empirical self, understood 
as morality in the sphere of concrete performance in the world, were thus 
seen as parts of the same thing. (Dessein 2016, 282)
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Mou’s Version of Confucianism and Kantian Philosophy
Mou Zongsan articulates and rationalizes a moral metaphysics5 similar to that 
of his teacher Shili Xiong. Mou’s intellectual ideas address the boundary of Kan-
tian philosophy and assert the ways in which Confucianism exceeds Kantian mo-
rality, particularly in his works such Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy 
(1974) and Phenomenon and Thing-in-Itself (1990), which show his commitment 
to engagement with Kant (Bresciani 2001; Bunnin 2008). While Confucianism 
encourages Mou to transmute the Kantian concepts of “intellectual intuition”, 
“Thing-in-Itself ” and “moral autonomy”, perhaps not only because of Kant’s em-
phasis on the limits of knowledge and Confucian way of promoting knowledge of 
the world, but also Kant’s asymmetrical emphasis on the doctrine of the method, 
Mou presents his philosophy in Kantian terms and inherits these ideas in his 
philosophical conceptions (Billioud 2006). Why he does so is not entirely clear, 
but looking at Mou’s comparative study of Mencius and Kant scholars like Qiong 
Guo consider that he employs these concepts to facilitate a dialogue between 
the West and East through a demonstration of the compatibility of Chinese and 
Western philosophies (Guo 2007, 345–46, 349). Moreover, Sébastien Billioud 
discusses how Kant remains a pivotal subject of philosophical departure for Mou: 
Kant is a pivotal reference for Mou, who considers that his emphasis both 
on the limits of knowledge and on the importance of practical philosophy 
echoes, to some extent, the focus on “life” (shengming, i.e., self-cultivation 
and self-transformation) rather than on “nature” (ziran, i.e., knowledge 
of the world) favoured by Chinese thought. However, though this prox-
imity is a strong argument in favour of a dialogue with Kant, it should 
not be overstated. The very structure of Kant’s masterpieces (a “Doctrine 
of Elements”, a “Doctrine of Method”) is revealing: on the other hand, 
the emphasis on method is for Mou an interesting departure point for a 
dialogue with Chinese thought; on the other hand, the total asymmetry 
between the two-part (a huge doctrine of the elements, a tiny doctrine of 
method), especially in the critique of reason, also points, in Mou’s opin-
ion, to the weakness and deficiencies of the Kantian project. (Billioud 
2011, 10) 
Kant’s critical philosophy has been developed, critiqued and renovated through 
Mou’s philosophical lens. Mou attempts to connect Confucianism and Kantian-
ism because he finds both are corroborated by the dao (Way), where the dao is a 
fundamental truth and these two philosophies just manifest the different aspects 
5 That discusses the link between morality and ontology indicating the moral value of objects and self.
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of it ( Jiadong 2005; Schmidt 2011). Mou approaches Kant critically and com-
paratively, and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in particular remains his centre of 
attraction, and one of his key criticisms involves Kant’s esteem for free will as 
something theoretical (Chan 2006; Guo 2007). The different here with Kant is 
that Mou considers morality as something real, and thus moral life is not confined 
within the theoretical paradigm. This conjecture derives from Mou’s understand-
ing of the metaphysical necessity of the ability to develop one’s moral praxis. With 
this, Mou shapes a moral metaphysics within the precept of subjectivism, while 
Kant conceives that intellectual intuition is only subject to God. However, we can 
also understand Mou’s intellectual intuition with reference to Heidegger’s “fun-
damental ontology”—where due to reinterpreting phenomenology, Heidegger 
considers that ontological examination is indeed something more prehistoric, as 
against the ontical examination of the positive sciences (Heidegger 2010, 3). Mou 
attributes intellectual intuition to human beings’ ability to perceive this intuition, 
which is superior, as Mou explores, to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology (Chan 
2006). Mou departs from Heidegger only because of Kant, who believes that true 
metaphysics is transcendent. Mou then transforms Kant’s philosophy into what 
is widely referred to as “Mind Confucianism”, also known as New Confucianism. 
Mou and the Concept of imago Dei
While Kant finds the highest intellectual intuition is to be close to God, Mou 
anthropocentrically makes it possible to develop one’s “inborn human qualities”, 
which can also be elaborated with Neo-Calvinist Dutch theologian Herman Bav-
inck’s (1854–1921) idea of “inborn human qualities” as the centre of imago Dei. 
As a theologian, Bavinck is quite well-known to Christian Chinese intellectuals. 
His books The Philosophy of Revelation (1909) and Essays on Religion, Science and 
Society (translated in 2008) remain quite insightful to readers (see Bavinck 1908; 
2008). His vision of considering human beings as not carrying the reflection of 
God’s highest goodness, but instead as the image of Him when both their soul 
and body practice righteousness, goodness and holiness, has recently been stud-
ied concerning Mou’s New Confucian philosophy of “the inner benevolence and 
righteousness of human heart-mind (renyi neizai yu xin)” (Xu 2017, 301). Mou’s 
philosophy is focused on a moral subjectivity and autonomy that designate his hu-
man-cantered optimism. His interpretation concerning “inborn human qualities” 
is to declare the complete transcendence of humanity and the essential goodness 
of these qualities. Bavinck expresses the theocentric view of “inborn human qual-
ities”, promoting God as the absolute archetype, not humanity, but attempts to 
show the relationship between God and humankind where humanity is the imago 
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Dei, that can only be reinstated in Christ. The ideas of Mou and Bavinck are in-
terconnected, because a dialogue has been created by showing a buffer zone with 
a clear differentiation between Bavinck’s God and Kant’s God (ibid., 323). More-
over, the parallel understanding between the “descending heavenly decree” and 
the imago Dei displays the formulation of their dialogical relationship. The idea 
of imago Dei can not only be articulated with the form of “descending heavenly 
decree” in Confucianism, but this can also be enhanced and developed through 
the further elaboration of modern ideas on the imago Dei. It is important to note 
that Mou’s idea regarding outer kingliness can further be highlighted through a 
discussion of Bavinck’s political theology and organism, by incorporating meta-
physical elements to reflect his moral metaphysics: 
The kingliness is concerned with democracy and science, which is the 
consequence of the realization of inner sageness through self-cultiva-
tion to save and revitalize China. Mou’s outer kingliness is characterized 
by individualism, which particularly highlights individual moral efforts. 
This moral praxis will contribute to the construction of a community, 
in a broad sense, namely a nation. Mou adopts the pattern of individu-
al-to-community to elaborate outer kingliness [...] His “outer kingliness” 
simplifies and reduces the problem of evil to political and social issues 
so as to deal with the cultural and political crisis in China. His failure to 
construe the multifaceted causes of evil leads to a politically and cultural-
ly Sinocentric outer kingliness [...] In this regard, Bavinck’s organicism is 
an appropriate supplement to Mou’s outer kingliness. Bavinck critiques 
the non-Christian worldview as it “lacks the concept of humanity as a 
single interrelated organism and could never come up with the idea of a 
kingdom in which both the individual and the group would develop their 
full identities”. Bavinck here articulates an organic relationship between 
individual and community by the notion of the Kingdom. The Kingdom, 
which is the highest good, is intimately connected to every aspect of 
life. It includes political life. Hence, the organic relationship also involves 
Bavinck’s Political Theology. (Xu 2017, 322)
My study emphasizes and explores the concept of imago Dei because the idea seems 
to be one of the key issues not only for the philosophical discussion of Mou and 
Kant, but also for other Western philosophers who critically engage with absolute 
goodness and the exercise of free will. The idea of imago Dei even seems to be of 
high interest to intellectuals of the 20th century and after. In the modern era as 
well as in contemporary times, this Latin expression imago Dei (“Image of God”) 
has often been connected to the ideas of “freedom/free-will” and relationality. For 
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example, the 20th century Swiss philosopher Emil Brunner expresses states that 
the social aspects of “inborn human qualities”, as beings created in the image of 
God, signify being as “Subject, or freedom”; it is the way that humanity is distin-
guished from other creatures (Brunner 2014, 55). This discussion relates to Mou’s 
approach to New Confucianism, where Mou’s stresses the exercise of free will 
for the highest goodness. Additionally, Mou’s approach to New Confucianism 
can also be understood with the 20th century French philosopher Paul Ricoeur 
(1913–2005), who is known for synthesizing phenomenology with hermeneutics. 
Ricoeur asserts that imago Dei does not have any defined meaning, and the author 
of the Genesis Creation Narrative (creation myth) has surely not mastered its full 
treasure of meaning: “In the very essence of the individual, in terms of its quality 
as a subject; the image of God, we believe, is the very personal and solitary pow-
er to think and to choose; it is interiority” (Ricoeur and Gingras 1961, 37). For 
Ricoeur, the imago Dei can best be articulated through structures of experience 
and perfect consciousness (phenomenology), and thus can be concluded as some-
thing determined by free will (ibid., 50). Moreover, this idea of free will also has 
a strong place in Heidegger’s phenomenological stance, and it differs from Kant’s 
view regarding free will, as will be discussed below. 
Philosophical Intersection between Mou and Heidegger
Mou’s critique and transformation of Kant’s ideas led him to Martin Heideg-
ger (1889–1976). Mou found interest in Heidegger through reading his books, 
specifically Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1997) and the Introduction to 
Metaphysics (2000), where Heidegger extensively discusses and criticizes Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason (see Heidegger 1997; 2000). Mou’s explanation of Kant’s 
philosophy was thus deeply influenced by Heidegger’s philosophy. For example, 
Mou transforms his approach to explaining the first critique by Kant from an 
epistemological to an ontological approach (Chan 2006, 126–27). Mou’s book 
Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (1974) reflects on of Heidegger’s 
thoughts, where Mou considers chapters from Being and Time. However, Mou 
criticizes Heidegger’s essential ontology in terms of his moral metaphysics. Mou’s 
early work, Substance of Mind and Substance of Humaneness (see Mou 1969), is also 
influenced by Heidegger, and contemporary scholars like Chan believe that, based 
on Max Müller’s works, Mou’s declaration of the “Three Modes of Neo-Confu-
cianism” draws from Heidegger’s “Three ontological differences” (Chan 2012). 
Additionally, Sébastien Billioud discusses how Mou observes Heidegger’s funda-
mental ontology: 
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Heidegger’s starting point is the radical finitude of human existence, and 
Mou Zongsan observes that fundamental ontology is the ontological 
analysis of this limited essence (ren de youxian benzhi). Such an ontology 
should make it possible to disclose “the Being of Dasein”. Dasein relates 
to man questioning his own existence which he finds problematic and 
which consequently raises the issue of Being, the issue of his Being when 
he is gobbled up by daily reality. Mou Zongsan translates the concept in 
several different ways: zai nali, zaizheli, you chujing de zai (which literally 
corresponds to the idea of “being in situation”) orhunran zhong chu de 
cunzhe zhi zai which we could try to translate as the “Being of beings in-
dulged in everyday life”. Everyday life (Alltäglichkeit, richangxing) “from 
which Heidegger starts his analysis of human existence” represents the 
most concrete dimension of our existence. (Billioud 2006, 227) 
To a certain extent, Mou Zongsan shows his agreement with Heidegger’s explana-
tion of Kant. He commences a dual-layer frame of conceiving the transcendental 
purpose of Kantian categories, “logical” and “ontological” layers of understanding. 
Mou proposes that Kant’s thesis of “objectivity is subjectivity” denies the “ontical 
proposition” and supports the “ontological proposition”, where he shows consent 
to the analysis of Transcendental Schematism by Heidegger, signifying the de-
notation of objectification which presumes a subjective horizon that makes the 
object appear. Mou asserts the ontology of the phenomenal world, calling it “at-
tached ontology” (ibid.). Here Mou encircles Heidegger’s position of the subjec-
tive character of transcendental distinction by Kant, learning it from the Kantbuch 
itself. Heidegger argues that the difference between the notion of a thing in itself 
and the presence of it is not objective but only subjective: “the thing in itself is not 
another but another aspect of the representation with regard to the same object” 
(Heidegger 1997, 37). In his treatise, Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy, 
Mou embraces a critical approach to the “fundamental ontology” by Heidegger, 
showing how he fails to reflect the significance of true mind: 
Heidegger’s descriptions could let us think of disclosure of “true mind” 
(zhen xin) for instance when he speaks about “call of consciousness” (ruf, 
liangxix de huhuan), feeling of guilt (jiuze zhi gan), dread (Sorge, jiiaolu), 
determined being (Entschlossenheit, jueduan) or nothingness (Nichtigkeit, 
xuwu). Nevertheless, all these descriptions are still “floating” and he has 
not been able to pave the way for a “true mind”. (Mou 1974, 362) 
For Mou, Heidegger’s thoughts are sometimes “floating” due to his inability to 
identify the transcendental reality, but he emphasizes immanent metaphysics to 
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advance his essential ontology. For Mou, true metaphysics is “transcendental” 
(ibid., 32), and since the immanent metaphysics only concentrates on the prob-
lem of the connotation of phenomenal beings, it is unable to cope with Kantian 
transcendental notions of God, immortality, and freedom. Moreover, Mou takes 
Heidegger’s intellectual thoughts as something too ambitiously romantic that are 
incapable of maintaining an essential serenity to reach to the idea of “true mind”. 
Mou also finds Heidegger’s approach something “morally-neutral”, and this lack 
of moral awareness reflects that his (Heidegger’s) essential ontology is incapable 
of reaching the arena of moral metaphysics, and suggests a futile response to the 
subject (Liangkang 2002). Therefore, Heidegger becomes a mere “commentator” 
of Kant because he only stays with the Kantian thesis of the “finitude” of a hu-
man being, and cannot identify human being’s intellectual intuition, and thus 
his fundamental ontology results in an unsuccessful contribution to philosophy 
(Mou 1975).6 It is important to note here that some scholars suggest that Mou’s 
critique of Heidegger’s essential ontology misplaces his (Heidegger’s) transcen-
dental metaphysics, because Mou could have agreed more than he thought (Li-
angkang 2002). Moreover, Heidegger’s explanation of Being essentially reaches 
a parallel metaphysical level with Mou’s explanations of transcendental ideas of 
freedom, ren or Dao and God. Moreover, they share an analogous interpretation of 
knowledge, where Mou considers that moral learning leads to moral metaphysics 
and Heidegger considers that human beings can open themselves to Being in 
their everyday lives. What is also crucial, and Mou has not articulated, is to un-
derstand the conception of time between Kant and Heidegger. Heidegger’s time 
offers both essential characteristics for being an essential revelation of being where 
time remains a priori knowledge for Kant and it is the temporality of Dasein—the 
experience of Being that is peculiar to human beings. Therefore, to some extent, 
there is a fundamental nature in Heidegger’s time and Being, which overwhelms 
the regular perception of time in a phenomenal world. As such, Mou’s metaphys-
ics does not depart from Heidegger’s metaphysics, but rather they intersect and 
meet at a common ground: the relationship between the phenomenal world and 
metaphysical ontology. This is the same relationship that his teacher Xiong Shili 
called on him to recognize in the fundamental unification of the two through 
intellectual intuition, the concept of which is broadly revealed in Confucian, 
Neo-Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist thoughts. The idea of intellectual intuition 
is also manifested in the Neo-Confucian thinker Wang Yangming through the 
various courses of action. For Mou, this is not something highly complex but a 
6 See Marthe Chandler’s review of Li Zehou’s The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition (Chandler 2012, 148). 
Chandler discusses that Wing-Cheuk Chan (2006) translates the title as Phenomenon and Thing-
in-Itself. 
Azijske_studije_2020_3_FINAL.indd   82 9. 09. 2020   13:21:14
83Asian Studies VIII (XXIV ), 3 (2020), pp. 63–87
form of knowledge system that can be gained through our daily performances and 
mannerisms, including emotions and intentions. 
Conclusion—Mou’s Vision to Attain Universal Happiness
Intending to revitalize and restore Chinese cultural, political and moral traditions 
(particularly Confucianism), modern-day government officials, intellectuals and 
thinkers promote the slogan: “Chinese learning as essence, Western learning as 
a tool” (zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong) (Xu 2017). This has been well-practiced 
by contemporary Taiwanese philosophers who not only have worked for the re-
vitalization of the Chinese intellectual tradition, but also promoted it all over 
the world by connecting it with Western philosophical traditions. Mou offers 
his moral metaphysics, especially good consciousness (linagzhi) and intellectual 
intuition (zhi de zhijue), to recognize the substance in his philosophical system, 
and elects to interpret his intellectual thoughts using Heideggerian and Kantian 
terminology to promote the essence of morality, while Confucianism, which often 
refers to the essence of human beings and intellectual intuition, is the force of this 
morality, which exists within the intellectual and transcendental mind of individ-
uals across time and place. 
Mou believes that attributing human beings with intellectual intuition given then 
a moral responsibility which allows individuals to enter into universal intellectual 
goodness, including Chinese philosophical traditions and the Western intellec-
tual legacy. For example, this moral responsibility allows individuals to enter into 
Kant’s noumenon—objects or sensical event that exists independently of human 
sense or perception—which is completely unknowable through regular human 
sensation. For Mou, intellectual intuition for humans is the basis of all Chinese 
thought. In his book Phenomena and Noumena, Mou articulates that “if it’s true 
that human beings cannot have intellectual intuition, then the whole of Chinese 
philosophy must collapse completely” (Bunnin 2008, 624). This very claim is the 
quintessence of Mou’s philosophical expertise which, if it holds, shows that (New) 
Confucianism is intellectually ready for the challenges of today, and Mou’s con-
temporaries and successors debate its validity while maintaining the intellectual 
legitimacy of Chinese intellectual traditions and New Confucianism, autonomous 
of intellectual intuition. 
What is more significant in Mou, in harmony with his concept of intellectual 
intuition, is his devotion to the idea of moral transformation, in which he believes 
that all individuals without any restrictions of culture and creed can transcend 
themselves and in due course become sages. Mou’s idea of moral transformation 
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is not only grounded in Confucianism, but is also connected to the idea of the 
“highest good”—summum bonum—which centres both the Western moral phil-
osophical world of the Greco-Roma, Anglo-American and German intellectual 
legacy and the Eastern traditional philosophical principles. This is the ultimate 
idea or destination where there exists a connection between an individual’s pursue 
of happiness and the real achievement of happiness.
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